This book examines the dynamics of oil and gas conflicts within the context of federalism in Canada, an older federation with broadly a decentralized institutional design governing oil and gas, and Nigeria, a newer federation with a largely centralized design.
This book examines oil and gas conflict dynamics (or conflict processes/mechanisms) with emphasis on conflict over resource ownership, control, management, or regulation, as well as sharing of revenues within the context of federalism in Canada, an established federation with a consolidated democratic structure and, generally, a decentralized federal institutional design over oil and gas, and Nigeria, an emerging federation with a centralized federal institutional design.
This book aims to foster a better understanding of the particular challenges faced by resource-dependent countries or jurisdictions in managing their resource revenues through natural resource funds (NRFs). It explores the varieties of natural resource management strategies as dictated primarily by domestic politics, and how the potential negative distributional consequences of resource wealth management (the resource curse) may add political dimensions and potential conflicts to decisions about NRFs in ways that other sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) do not experience.