Political Philosophy and Public Purpose

This book addresses the fate of intellectuals in modern culture and politics. Russell Jacoby’s seminal The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe (1987, 2000) introduced the term “public intellectual” and gave rise to heated controversy. Here Jacoby assesses contemporary public intellectuals, their profound failings and limited achievements. The book includes biting appraisals of well-known intellectuals, such as Noam Chomsky, Hannah Arendt, and Bernard-Henri Lévy, as well as interventions on violence, utopia and multiculturalism.

This book considers whether critical theory is up to the task of addressing our contemporary crises, including the question of ‘post-truth’ discourse, psycho-social pathologies, the rise of right-wing populism, the Covid-19 pandemic, the anticolonial deficit in critical theory, and the neo-liberal management of the academy. The contributors offer a series of timely and complex reflections on the nature of critical theory, its role in contemporary society, and its various developments since the early twentieth century. In doing so, they analyse a variety of contemporary issues that, through critical reflection, can help us to navigate these problems. This volume seeks to highlight problems and possibilities within this field of thought, and endeavours to contribute towards reconsidering its capabilities and relevance.

This book brings together leading academics and activists to address the possibilities for qualitative social change beyond neoliberalism, providing introductory essays on alternative societies, transition, and resistance. Bringing together discussions on universal basic income, actually existing communism, parecon, circular economies, workers co-operatives, ‘fully automated luxury communism,' trade unionism, and party politics, the volume provides one of the first scholarly interventions to systematically evaluate possibilities for transition and resistance across theoretical, political, and disciplinary traditions.

This book proposes a new interpretation of Claude Lefort’s thought focusing on his phenomenological method. Although all scholars recognize the influence of Merleau-Ponty, so far no one has demonstrated the fundamental coherence between Merleau-Ponty’s theory and the main concepts proposed by Lefort; in particular between the concept of institution and the definitions of social and democracy. If Merleau-Ponty uses the idea of institution to think beyond the division between subject and object, to think together continuity and difference, permanence and change, this same concept allows Lefort to understand society as both conflict and unity. From this starting point, this study will attempt to clarify Lefort’s concept of the political and his interpretations of modernity, humanism, and the work of Niccolò Machiavelli. These very concepts will show the difference from structuralism, Michel Foucault’s contemporary theory and theories of immanence. At the same time this study highlights an internal tension in Lefort’s own thinking: between autonomy and experience, institution and insurgence.

This book extends the approach that Murray and Schuler develop in their companion volume, False Moves in Philosophy and Social Theory: Losing Public Purpose. The chapters form a connected inquiry into consequences of capital, a far-reaching social form, through a critique of political economy and the mindset it shares with much modern philosophy and social theory. The authors call this bifurcating mentality factoring philosophy. Factoring philosophy mistakes the distinguishable for the separable. It splits the subjective and objective, form and content, and it takes the object of social theory to be an impossible economy-in-general, stripped of constitutive social forms. The critique of factoring philosophy structures the collection, which makes a wide-ranging contribution to the research field of the critique of political economy as critical social theory. Ultimately, this book solidifies Murray and Schuler’s impact on the study of political economy, political philosophy, modern philosophy, Hegel, Marx, and critical theory. 

This book considers diverse philosophical topics unified by the identification of false moves commonly found in modern philosophy, mainstream Anglo-American philosophy, and social theory. The authors expose the sources of fundamental problems that recur in philosophy—basic problems with what the authors call „factoring philosophy.“ Factoring philosophy fails to attend to the phenomenological task of determining when what is distinguishable is separable and when not. Consequently, factoring philosophy makes phenomenological mistakes—false moves—when it treats as separable what is only distinguishable. Analytic philosophy is prone to false moves when it fails to recognize that phenomenology is the necessary complement to analysis. There is nothing wrong with analysis—we might as well give up thinking as give up analysis—and nothing is wrong with the values prized by analytic philosophy. As Hegel observed, “philosophizing requires, above all, that each thought should be grasped in its full precision and that nothing should remain vague and indeterminate.” Ultimately, this book contends that false moves prevail in philosophical analysis and social theory when they neglect their phenomenological foundations.