New Security Challenges

This book demonstrates that the disciplinary boundaries present within international relations approaches to security studies are redundant when examining social media, and inter- and multi-disciplinary analysis is key. A key result of the analysis undertaken is that when examining the social media sphere security scholars need to “expect the unexpected”. This is because social media enables users to subvert, contest and create security narratives with symbols and idioms of their choice which can take into account “traditional” security themes, but also unexpected and under explored themes such as narratives from the local context of the users’ towns and cities, and the symbolism of football clubs. The book also explores the complex topography of social media when considering constructions of security. The highly dynamic topography of social media is neither elite dominated and hierarchical as the Copenhagen School conceptualises security speak. However, neither is it completely flat and egalitarian as suggested by the vernacular security studies’ non-elite approach. Rather, social media’s topography is shifting and dynamic, with individuals gaining influence in security debates in unpredictable ways. In examining social media this book engages with the emancipatory burden of critical security studies. This book argues that it remains unfulfilled on social media and rather presents a “thin” notion of discursive emancipation where social media does provide the ability for previously excluded voices to participate in security debates, even if this does not result in their direct emancipation from power hierarchies and structures offline.

This book offers a comprehensive analysis of infrastructure insecurity issues in the historic Niger Delta, drawing on empirical fieldwork involving host communities, regulators, and multinational oil and gas operators. It introduces innovative models and theories, such as a pipeline life cycle model focusing on community development, community neglect aggression displacement theory, social aggression theory, stakeholders’ policy development model, contemporary poor governance cycle model, and an infrastructure insecurity nexus model, linking governance, socio-economic conditions, and infrastructure insecurity in resource-rich regions of the Global South. The book bridges gaps left by previous publications, providing depth and applicability of data. It employs the Frustration- Aggression Displacement theory to explain underlying triggers of violence and uses real-world case studies, diagrams, and charts to facilitate understanding. Suitable and engaging for individuals, communities, or regulators involved in oil and gas activities alike, this book offers valuable insights into onshore pipeline infrastructure insecurity in Nigeria, West Africa, and the broader Global South, addressing regulation, compliance, environmental concerns, social aspects, and technological innovations.

This book explores criminal threat to commercial security and the problem of the ethical control of political and criminal risk alongside and in the absence of government. Theoretically, it links ethics to geopolitics and political economy. Security Ethics: Commerce and Crime in a Polycentric World builds from well-known thinkers, but not theorists typically found in books of applied ethics and security studies. Chapters include Francisco de Vitoria’s account of just war applied to pirates; John Locke on dignity and the illegal trade in body parts; David Hume on community justice combatting cartels; Adam Smith on luxury and knockoffs; Bakunin and anarchist gunrunning; Johan Huizinga on play and crime; David Ross on corporate obligation in the face of partizan risk to hotel security; Carl Schmitt on geography and smuggling; Aurel Kolnai on privilege and corporate secrets; and David Petraeus, author of The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, respecting ecotage and commercial legitimacy.

This book is a story about Private Intelligence Contractors (PICs) and their relationship with the United States executive and legislative principals in the War on Terror when the line between the public and private sectors has been increasingly blurred. PICs have challenged the traditional approach which assumes that sensitive intelligence tasks should be performed by government officials because of their importance for national security. So this book examines the principal-agent relationship and the oversight problem between PICs, the US Intelligence Community (IC), the president and Congress after the 9/11 attacks. The book demonstrates that by exploiting information asymmetry, adversely selected PICs can violate legislative rules and goals such as by performing inherently governmental tasks, colluding with the IC, capturing the control of the task and contractual process, abuse, waste and fraud. In addition, to get around congressional oversight and achieve his or her hidden agenda, the executive principal can also mismanage contractors through the IC or delegate contractors to perform inherently governmental tasks.