The Cyprus Crisis 1967-1974

This book examines the Cyprus crisis of 1967-74 and pays particular attention to the specific objectives of the Greek junta in Cyprus and the different approaches of its leaders to the issue as well as to Turkey’s strategic considerations in the island. Its author argues that the Greek military rulers sought enosis (unity) with Cyprus mainly for reasons of national and political concern. They attached special attention on Cyprus, a great national – and emotional – issue, and a solution in favor of an “honorable settlement” was deemed essential to their ability to remain in power. Like their predecessors, they were prepared to achieve enosis by making concessions to the Turks, but unlike them, they were determined to move against Archbishop Makarios, the Cypriot president, who was opposed to such a solution, and neutralize him either by peaceful, or even violent, means.
The Cyprus crisis of 1967-74 cannot be analysed and understood in any depth without seriously and systematically taking into account the determining political influence and degree of involvement of external agents in Cyprus. The book focuses on the attitude of the superpowers and examines their strategic objectives in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East in relation to major regional actors such as Turkey and Israel. The author’s central hypothesis is that the 1974 invasions took place for reasons other than those claimed publicly by Turkey – to protect its minority and to prevent enosis (union) of the island with Greece – and that the USA and the USSR were primarily concerned with the island’s effect on the balance of power in the Near/Middle East rather than with the geostrategic significance of Cyprus itself.